Many oversubscribed treatments are allocated by randomized waiting lists. Applicants are ordered randomly, and treatment offers are made following that order until all seats are filled. In this paper, we propose new estimators of the effect of offering a seat and of the effect of the treatment that can be used in such settings. We show that our estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal. We review 39 articles using randomized waiting lists to estimate causal effects, and we show that the most commonly used estimators are not consistent. Finally, we use our estimators to revisit Behaghel et al. (2017) . Using our estimators leads to different conclusions from those one would reach with commonly used estimators.
Introduction
Oversubscribed treatments are often allocated by randomized waiting lists. Examples include some charter schools (see e.g. Dobbie & Fryer, 2011) , some small high schools (see e.g. Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2013) , or some vocational training programs (see e.g. Hirshleifer et al., 2015) . These treatments typically have capacity constraints for various pools of applicants. Let us for instance assume that a charter school receives 32 applications from students wishing to enter in sixth grade, where 20 seats are available, and 51 applications from students wishing to enter in tenth grade, where 25 seats are available. In our terminology, sixth and tenth grades applicants are two different pools: these applicants do not compete for the same seats. In each pool, a lottery randomly orders applicants on a waiting list. Applicants with a random order lower than or equal to the number of seats receive the initial round of offers. If all of them accept to get treated, offers stop. If some of them refuse, the next applicants in the waiting list receive offers. In each pool, offers stop when all the seats available for applicants from that pool have been filled.
No methodological paper has studied the identification and estimation of causal effects with randomized waiting lists. This is the purpose of this paper. Hereafter, we refer to applicants that accept to get treated if they receive an offer as "takers". Our first main result shows that the groups of applicants receiving and not receiving an offer are not statistically comparable. Indeed, the expected share of takers is larger in the group of applicants that receive an offer. Intuitively, this is because offers continue until sufficiently many applicants have accepted their offer, thus creating a correlation between receiving an offer and being a taker. This contrasts with standard randomized experiments, where the assignment of applicants to the treatment and to the control group is based on the flip of a coin, not on whether other applicants accept or decline to receive the treatment. Therefore, a comparison of the mean outcome of applicants receiving and not receiving an offer estimates the effect of receiving an offer, plus a selection bias term coming from the fact applicants receiving an offer bear a greater proportion of takers. This bias term is equal to zero only if takers and non takers have the same mean outcome when they do not receive an offer. As we explain in more detail later, this latter condition is testable and it has often been rejected in articles using randomized waiting lists.
Our second main result shows that surprisingly, it is sufficient to drop in each pool one taker from the group of applicants that receive an offer to restore the balance between the two groups. Based on this second result, we propose estimators of the effect of offering a seat on applicants' treatment and outcome, the so-called first-stage and intention-to-treat parameters, and of the effect of the treatment on the outcome of applicants that comply with their offer, the so-called local average treatment effect (LATE) parameter. Those estimators amount to comparing applicants that receive and that do not receive an offer, downweighting applicants accepting their offer by an amount equivalent to dropping one of them in each pool. We show that when the number of pools of applicants grows, our three estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal. We also propose consistent estimators of their asymptotic variances. One can use these results to draw inference on the first stage, the intention to treat, and the LATE. Simulations suggest that the resulting confidence intervals have correct coverage even when the number of pools is as low as 15, provided one implements a degree-of-freedom correction suggested by McCaffrey & Bell (2003) . Many articles using randomized waiting lists have more than 15 pools, but we still propose a randomization inference method for applications where this number is smaller.
Finally, we develop a number of extensions. First, offers made in the initial round of offers might not be equivalent to offers made in subsequent rounds. For instance, by the time subsequent-rounds offers are made, applicants might have signed up for a substitute to treatment, and might be less likely to get treated. We allow for this possibility and show that our main conclusions still apply. Second, instead of having strict capacity constraints, treatment implementers might rather have a minimum and a maximum number of applicants they are willing to admit in each pool. For instance, the hypothetical charter school considered above might be willing to accept, say, between 18 and 22 sixth grade applicants, and between 22 and 28 tenth grade applicants. We allow for this possibility and show that our main conclusions also still apply.
We review 39 articles using randomized waiting lists, and we find that they often use either of the two following methods to estimate causal effects. A first commonly used method amounts to running a regression of the treatment (resp. of the outcome) on a dummy for applicants that received an offer and on pool fixed effects to estimate the first stage (resp. the intention to treat). Accordingly, to estimate the LATE researchers run a two stage least squares (2SLS) regression of the outcome on the treatment and on pool fixed effects, using the offer dummy as the instrument for treatment. Hereafter, we refer to those estimators as the "ever offer estimators". A second commonly used method to estimate the LATE is to run a 2SLS regression of the outcome on the treatment, using a dummy for applicants in the initial round of offers as the instrument for treatment, and using propensity score to reweight applicants. Hereafter, we refer to this estimator as the "initial offer estimator".
We compare our estimators to the ever and initial offer estimators. First, ever offer estimators do not converge towards our parameters of interest when the number of pools grows. This is because they do not downweight takers that receive an offer, and because they give a larger weight to pools where the share of applicants receiving an offer is closer to 1/2. This latter feature of ever offer estimators also creates a difference between the share of takers among applicants receiving and not receiving an offer, as we explain in further detail later. Still, ever offer estimators usually have a smaller variance than our estimators. Therefore, there is a bias-variance trade-off between our estimators and ever-offer estimators. In simulations, we find that our estimators have a lower (resp. higher) root mean squared error in designs where pools bear a small (resp. high) proportion of takers, and in designs where pools bear a small (resp. large) number of applicants. Second, the initial offer estimator is a consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of the LATE. However, we find in simulations that its variance is usually substantially larger than that of the estimator of the LATE we propose.
We use our results to revisit Behaghel et al. (2017) . This article uses randomized waiting lists to study the effect of a boarding school in France on students' test scores. In this application, our estimator of the LATE is statistically significant while the initial offer estimator is not. Moreover, our estimator of the first stage significantly differs from the ever offer estimator of the first stage. Our estimator of the LATE is also 25% larger than the ever offer estimator of the LATE, though this difference is not statistically significant.
There are two takeaways from this paper. First, the initial offer estimator should not be used, as it is dominated by our estimator of the LATE. Second, researchers should estimate both our estimators and ever offer estimators. When they differ significantly, it might be preferable to report our estimators, as they are consistent.
Though we are the first to study randomized waiting lists, our paper is related to several other papers in the causal inference literature. First, our notation and some of our assumptions are similar to those in Imbens & Angrist (1994) and Angrist et al. (1996) . Second, in the proof of our main lemma, we condition on the sample. Then, the only source of randomness left is the random ordering of applicants in the waiting list, which we explicitly model. From that perspective, our approach is similar to that in Neyman (1923) , Abadie, Imbens & Zheng (2014) , and Abadie, Athey, Imbens & Wooldridge (2014) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of papers using randomized waiting lists. Section 3 presents our theoretical results. Section 4 presents some simulation results. Section 5 presents our empirical application. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
A review of papers using randomized waiting lists
In this section, we describe the data and estimators commonly used in articles using randomized waiting lists to estimate causal effects. To do so, we gathered a sample of such articles. We started from four articles estimating the effects of US charter schools whose seats are allocated by randomized waiting lists. Those are Dobbie & Fryer (2011) , Angrist et al. (2013) , Curto & Fryer (2014) , and Dobbie & Fryer Jr (2015) . Then, we reviewed the 380 articles cited by, and citing on Google scholar as of the end of June 2016, those four articles. Among those, we found 35 articles that use randomized waiting lists to estimate causal effects, thus leaving us with a sample of 39 articles. This methodology enabled us to find a large number of articles relatively fast, though it precluded us from obtaining a sample representative of articles using randomized waiting lists. A list of those 39 articles can be found in Table 8 in the appendix. 23 are published and 16 are not. Most of them consider educational treatments such as charter schools, school choice, small high schools, vocational training, etc.
All the treatments considered by these articles have capacity constraints for various pools of applicants, typically defined by their gender, their school grade, or their place of residence. 11 articles report the number of pools they use in their analysis. This number ranges from 2 to 725, and the median is 58. 12 articles report the number of applicants per pool. This number ranges from 12.91 to 299.50, and the median is 68.23. 2 articles report the ratio of seats to applicants in their data: one has a ratio of 0.52, while the other has a ratio of 0.36. 1
In each pool, a lottery takes place to randomly order applicants into a waiting list, and treatment offers are made according to that random ordering. Offers stop when all the seats have been filled. 13 articles report the share of applicants that decline a treatment offer. This share ranges from 0.07 to 0.64, and the median is 0.30.
All articles estimate the LATE, most also estimate the first stage, and none estimate the intention to treat. All articles use 2SLS regressions to estimate the LATE. However, not all of them use the same instrument. 12 articles use the initial offer dummy. 17 articles use the ever offer dummy. 3 articles use the initial offer dummy in some specifications, and the ever offer dummy in other specifications. Five articles use other instruments. For instance, one article uses a dummy for applicants receiving an initial offer and for the 10 applicants ranked immediately below them. Finally, two articles do not specify the instrument they use.
Because they use data from several pools of applicants, all those articles need to ensure they compare applicants within and not across pools. To do so, 32 articles include pool fixed effects in their regressions, while seven use propensity score weights (see Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) .
To conduct inference, some articles use robust standard errors. Articles that have several observations per applicant, for instance because they follow them over several years, typically use standard errors clustered at the applicant level. Some articles that study school-level treatments use standard errors clustered at the school or at the school × grade level. Finally, five articles use standard errors clustered at the pool of applicants level.
Overall, most articles using randomized waiting lists to estimate causal effects use the ever or the initial offer estimators. In the next section, we propose new estimators, we derive their statistical properties, and we compare them to the ever and to the initial offer estimators.
Theoretical results

Framework, assumptions, and parameters of interest
Our unit of observation is a pool of applicants for an oversubscribed treatment. We assume that this pool is drawn randomly from, and therefore representative of, a large population of pools of applicants for oversubscribed treatments. Let N and S respectively denote the number of applicants and the number of seats for treatment available in this pool. In the population from which this pool is drawn, pools might not all have the same number of applicants and seats. Therefore, N and S are random variables. For any random variable U , let E(U ) denote its expectation in the population of pools of applicants. Let E A (U ) ≡ E (N/E(N ) × U ) denote the expectation of U in the population of applicants. When averaging over applicants, pools need to be reweighted proportionately to their number of applicants. Pools with many applicants then receive a greater weight than pools with few.
Seats for treatment are offered as follows. First, each applicant is randomly assigned a number R i included between 1 and N . Then, applicants with R i ≤ S receive an offer to get the treatment. If all of them accept, no other applicant receives an offer. If r of these applicants refuse their offer, applicants with S < R i ≤ S + r receive an offer, and so on and so forth until S applicants have accepted to get treated. Let L denote the random number of the last applicant receiving an offer. Let Z i = 1{R i ≤ L} be a dummy equal to 1 if applicant i ever receives an offer. Following Angrist et al. (1996) , let D i (0) (resp. D i (1)) denote the potential treatment of applicant i if she does not (resp. does) receive an offer to get treated. Let takers be applicants with D i (1) = 1, let non-takers be those with D i (1) = 0, and let T = N i=1 D i (1) denote the number of takers. Treatment implementers can usually ensure that after the offer process has terminated, applicants that did not receive an offer do not receive the treatment. However, some of those applicants sometimes eventually manage to get treated, so we allow for this possibility and we do not impose that D i (0) = 0. Then, and following Angrist et al. (1996) , let never takers be applicants such that D i (0) = D i (1) = 0, let always takers be applicants such that D i (0) = D i (1) = 1, let compliers be such that D i (0) = 0 and D i (1) = 1, and let defiers be such that
We now introduce and discuss the assumptions we consider in this paper. Let
denote a vector stacking the number of seats for treatment available, the number of applicants, and their potential treatments and outcomes. For any integer j, let Π j denote the set of permutations of {1, ..., j}. Let also j! = j × (j − 1) × ... × 1, with the convention that 0! = 1. Let R = (R 1 , ..., R N ) denote the vector of random numbers assigned to applicants.
Assumption 1 (Conditional on P, R follows a uniform distribution on Π N ) For every (r 1 , ..., r N ) ∈ Π N , P (R = (r 1 , ..., r N )|P) = 1 N ! . Assumption 1 requires that conditional on N , applicants' random numbers be assigned independently of S, 1) ) i∈{1,...,N } , and that R be uniformly distributed on Π N . The randomized waiting lists used to allocate oversubscribed treatments usually satisfy Assumption 1.
Assumption 2 (Strictly more takers than seats) 2 ≤ S < T .
Assumption 2 requires that there be at least two seats in each pool in the population. As T ≤ N , Assumption 2 also requires that each pool have strictly more applicants than seats. These two conditions are not problematic as they can be assessed from the data: Pools with less than two seats or with less applicants than seats can merely be withdrawn from the analysis. The former category is likely to correspond to very small pools, and the latter can anyway not be used because all of its applicants end up receiving an offer. Assumption 2 also requires that in each pool, there be strictly more takers than seats. This condition cannot be assessed from the data. When the seats for treatment available in a pool eventually get filled, one must have that S ≤ T . However, the data do not reveal whether applicants that do not receive an offer are takers or non-takers, and therefore one cannot know whether S < T or S = T : All applicants that do not receive an offer might be non-takers. Still, we show in Subsection 3.5 that one can test the null hypothesis S = T . 1) ) denote a vector stacking the potential treatments and outcomes of applicant i. Let also ∼ denote equality in distribution.
For every
Assumption 3 (Identically distributed potential treatments and outcomes) For every (i, j) ∈ {1, ..., N } 2 , P i |N ∼ P j |N . Moreover, (N, P i ) has a first moment.
Assumption 3 requires that conditional on N , the potential treatments and outcomes of applicants be identically distributed. This weak assumption will for instance be satisfied if the indexes 1, ..., N are randomly assigned to applicants once the pool has been drawn. Under As- 1) ) denote a vector of random variables with the same distribution as P i for every i ∈ {1, ..., N }. Assumption 3 also requires that (N, P i ) have a first moment, which is also a weak assumption.
Assumption 4 is the monotonicity condition in Imbens & Angrist (1994) . It requires that there be no defier in the pool. Identification could also be obtained under the weaker compliersdefiers condition in de Chaisemartin (Forthcoming), but for the sake of simplicity we derive our identification results under Assumption 4.
Assumption 5 is the exclusion restriction in Angrist et al. (1996) . It requires that receiving a treatment offer does not have an effect per se on applicants' potential outcomes.
We focus on three parameters of interest. First, we consider the average effect of offering the treatment on applicants' outcome, the so-called intention to treat (ITT) parameter:
Second, we consider the average effect of offering the treatment on applicants' treatment, the so-called first-stage (FS) parameter:
Third, under Assumption 5 we consider the average effect of the treatment on compliers' outcome, the so-called LATE parameter:
Identification
For every i ∈ {1, ...., N }, let
Therefore, in the group of applicants receiving (resp. not receiving) an offer, w 1 i (resp. w 0 i ) are positive weights summing up to 1. w 0 i gives to the N − L applicants that do not receive an offer a weight equal to 1/(N − L). In the group receiving an offer, w 1 i over-represents the L − S non-takers by giving them a weight equal to 1/(L − 1), while it under-represents the S takers by giving them a weight equal to (1 − 1/S)/(L − 1). This decreases the share of takers in this group by the same amount as dropping one taker. Indeed, the sum of w 1 i over the S takers receiving an offer is equal to (S − 1)/(L − 1), while the sum of w 1 i over the L − S non-takers receiving an offer is equal to (L − S)/(L − 1). There are two advantages of reweighting applicants that receive an offer by w 1 i instead of dropping one taker. First, dropping one taker would raise the question as to which of the S takers receiving an offer should be dropped. Second, dropping a taker would result in estimators with greater variances than those we propose below. 
Lemma 3.1 shows that applicants receiving and not receiving an offer have in expectation the same average potential treatments and outcomes, provided they are respectively reweighted by w 1 i and w 0 i . For example, let φ(
. Once reweighted by w 1 i and w 0 i , applicants receiving and not receiving an offer have the same expected proportion of takers. Conversely, Lemma 3.1 implies that
Without reweighting, applicants receiving an offer have a larger expected proportion of takers than applicants not receiving an offer.
Let us illustrate this through a numerical example. Assume that the pool we consider bears 6 applicants, that 4 of them are takers, and that 2 seats for treatment are available. Table 1 below presents the 6 4 = 15 possible orderings of takers (t) and non-takers (nt) in the waiting list. 2 Under Assumption 1, each ordering has a probability 1 15 of being realized. For each ordering, L is the rank of the second taker in the waiting list. Applicants with a random number lower than or equal to L receive an offer. They are underlined. Table 1 ), the group of applicants receiving an offer will bear 100% of takers, while the group of applicants not receiving an offer will bear 50% of takers. If the thirteenth ordering gets realized (last but two column of Table 1), both groups will bear two thirds of takers. Across the 15 possible orderings, the expectation of the share of takers among applicants receiving an offer is equal to 1 15
(1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 1/2 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 1/2 + 1/2) = 23/30, while the expectation of the share of takers among those not receiving an offer is equal to 1
15
(1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 1 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 1 + 1) = 2/3.
This illustrates the fact that
. Now, if in each ordering one drops a taker from the group of applicants receiving an offer, the expected value of the share of takers in this group becomes equal to 1 15
(1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/3) = 2/3.
This illustrates the fact that E
As explained above, reweighting applicants receiving an offer by w 1 i changes the share of takers in this group by the same amount as dropping one taker.
We can now state the main result of this paper. Let
Theorem 3.1
2. If Assumptions 1-5 are satisfied, then
.
The first statement of Theorem 3.1 shows that under Assumptions 1-3, ∆ IT T is identified by E A (∆ Y ). The intuition for this result goes as follows. ∆ Y is the difference between the w 1 i -reweighted mean of Y among applicants receiving an offer and the w 0 i -reweighted mean of Y among applicants not receiving an offer. As shown in Lemma 3.1, the w 1 i -and w 0 ireweighting ensure that applicants receiving and not receiving an offer bear in expectation the same proportion of takers, and have in expectation the same average potential outcomes. Therefore, these two reweighted groups are statistically comparable, and the expectation of the difference between their average outcome identifies the average effect of receiving an offer on applicants' outcome. Following the same intuition, under Assumptions 1-3 one also has that ∆ F S is identified by E A (∆ D ). The second statement of Theorem 3.1 shows that under
. This directly follows from the first statement of the theorem and from Assumptions 4 and 5.
Estimation and inference
In this subsection, we propose, and study the asymptotic properties of, estimators of ∆ IT T , ∆ F S , and ∆ LAT E . To do so, we assume that we observe K pools of applicants for oversubscribed treatments. In our asymptotic analysis, we let K go to infinity while assuming that the number of applicants per pool remains bounded in probability. Simulations shown in subsection 4.2 suggest that this asymptotic approximation works well even when K is as small as 15, provided one implements a degree-of-freedom correction described in further detail therein. For applications with a smaller number of pools, we propose another inference method in the end of this subsection.
For every k ∈ {1, ..., K}, let
denote a vector stacking the number of seats and applicants in pool k, and their potential treatments and outcomes. Let also
denote the number of takers in pool k, and let R k = (R 1k , ..., R N k k ) denote a vector stacking the random numbers attributed to each applicant in pool k. Finally, let L k denote the random number of the last applicant receiving an offer in pool k, let Z ik = 1{R ik ≤ L k } be a dummy denoting whether applicant i in pool k ever received an offer for treatment, let D ik and Y ik denote her observed treatment and outcome, and let
Our inference results rely on the two following assumptions.
Assumption 6 (Independent and identically distributed pools of applicants)
, and have the same probability distribution as (P, R).
Assumption 6 requires that the random variables attached to different pools be mutually independent. Articles using randomized waiting lists to estimate causal effects often use robust standard errors to conduct inference. The validity of those standard errors rely on a more stringent condition than Assumption 6: The random variables attached to different applicants should be mutually independent, even if they belong to the same pool. This assumption cannot hold. For instance, for every k one must have
implying that the treatments and offers of applicants belonging to the same pool are negatively correlated. This correlation becomes negligible when N k grows, but as we saw in Section 2, articles using randomized waiting lists often have small values of N k . Assumption 6 might still not be plausible when the same applicants appear in several pools. In such instances, we recommend using standard errors clustered both at the applicant and at the pool level. Finally, Assumption 6 does not require pools to be homogeneous. Pools can have different numbers of applicants, seats, takers, etc. They just need to be drawn independently from the same distribution.
Assumption 7 (Existence of second moments)
Assumption 7 is a technical condition which is necessary to ensure that our estimators are asymptotically normal. It will for instance hold if Assumption 2 holds and the outcome has bounded support.
We can now define our estimators.
Let alsoÊ
Finally, let d −→ and p −→ respectively denote convergence in distribution and in probability of sequences of random variables indexed by K when K goes to +∞. 
2. If Assumptions 1-7 are satisfied, then
Theorem 3.2 shows thatÊ
, and ∆ LAT E . This directly follows from well-known results on the linearization of ratios.
In applications with a small number of pools of applicants, it is not advisable to rely on Theorem 3.2 to draw inference on ∆ IT T and ∆ LAT E . Instead, one can follow the steps described below to test the null hypothesis that (1)) with level α. Those steps are the following:
2. In each pool, redraw a vector of random numbers (R * 1k , ..., R * N k k ) and estimatê
3. Repeat step 2 B times, where B is a large integer.
4. CompareÊ A ∆ Y to the α/2th and 1 − α/2th quantiles ofÊ * A ∆ Y over those B replications. Reject the null ifÊ A ∆ Y is lower than the α/2th quantile, or if it is greater than the 1 − α/2th quantile.
In simulations shown in Subsection 4.2, we find that even when the number of pools is small, this test has correct size. Here is some intuition as to why this is the case. A consequence of Lemma 1 is that i:R ik ≤L k w 1 ik Y ik has the same probability distribution as the sample mean of
ik Y ik has the same probability distribution as the sample mean of (1)), the difference between these two quantities has the same distribution as the difference between the sample means of Y (0, D(0)) in two random samples of L k − 1 and N k − L k applicants. Therefore, under the nullÊ A ∆ Y has the same distribution as the average of this difference over K pools, just asÊ * A ∆ Y . Thus, ifÊ A ∆ Y lies at the extremes of the distribution ofÊ * A ∆ Y , one can reject the null.
Two last comments on the null hypothesis being tested are in order. First, this null concerns the distribution of Y (0, D (0)) and
, the converse is not true. Therefore, the null might be rejected while ∆ IT T = 0, for instance if Y (0, D (0)) and Y (1, D (1)) have the same mean but different variances. This is not specific to our setting: randomization tests are always distributional tests. 3 Second, this null concerns the effect of offering a seat, not the effect of the treatment. But under Assumptions, 4-5 one can show that
, meaning that the randomization test we propose is actually a test of the effect of the treatment on compliers' outcome distribution.
Comparison with the ever and initial offer estimators
Comparison with the ever offer estimators
on Z ik and pool fixed effects. Let alsoβ E F E denote the coefficient of D ik in a 2SLS regression of Y ik on D ik and pool fixed effects, using Z ik as the instrument. As shown in Section 2,γ E F E , α E F E , andβ E F E have often been used to respectively estimate ∆ IT T , ∆ F S , and ∆ LAT E . In the remainder of this subsection, we compareβ
, but the same conclusions would hold if we were to compareγ
β E F E does not converge towards ∆ LAT E when the number of pools of applicants goes to +∞. Using well-known results on linear regression coefficients (see e.g. Equation (3.3.7) in Angrist & Pischke, 2008) , one can show that under Assumption 6 and appropriate technical conditions, β E F E converges towards
Indeed, under the reweighting attached to β E F E , applicants with Z i = 1 and Z i = 0 have in expectation different proportions of takers, thus implying that Z i violates the random instrument assumption in Angrist et al. (1996) . This arises from two features of β E F E . First, β E F E does not systematically downweight applicants that receive an offer and get treated.
As discussed in Subsection 3.2, without this downweighting applicants with Z i = 1 bear in expectation a larger proportion of takers than applicants with Z i = 0. Second, β E F E gives a larger weight to pools where L/N , the share of applicants receiving an offer, is closer to 1/2. This also creates a difference between the share of takers in the two groups. To understand why, it might help to consider a simple example where all pools have 20 seats, 40 applicants, and 25 takers. In each pool, between 20 and 35 applicants receive an offer. As |l/40 − 1/2| is increasing in l for l ∈ {20, 21, ..., 35}, β E F E systematically gives a greater weight to pools where fewer applicants receive an offer. This increases the share of takers in the group of applicants with Z i = 1, and decreases it in the group with Z i = 0. Indeed, pools where few applicants receive an offer are those where the share of takers among applicants with Z i = 1 is the highest, and where the share of takers among applicants with Z i = 0 is the lowest. Unfortunately, it is not possible to derive a simple formula for β E F E − ∆ LAT E , the asymptotic bias ofβ E F E . 4 However, it is possible to describe how this asymptotic bias is affected by various characteristics of pools.
First, this asymptotic bias diminishes when the number of seats and applicants per pool grow. The bias arising from the fact β E F E does not downweight applicants that receive an offer and get treated diminishes when the number of seats grows. When S → +∞, (1 − D i /S) → 1, thus implying that E A ∆ Y /E A ∆ D no longer downweights those applicants. The bias arising from the fact β E F E gives a larger weight to pools where L/N is closer to 1/2 diminishes when the number of applicants grows. One can show that V (L/N |P) → 0 when N → +∞, provided that T /N → t ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, when pools grow, the variability in L/N arising from applicants' random ordering disappears, and β E F E no longer over-or under-represents pools depending on takers' rank in the waiting list.
Second, one can show that this asymptotic bias is equal to 0 when compliers have the same mean of Y (0) as never takers and the same mean of Y (1) as always takers. Accordingly, in simulations shown in Subsection 4.1 we find that the bias ofβ E F E is an increasing function of the difference between the mean of Y (0) among compliers and never takers and of the difference between the mean of Y (1) among compliers and always takers. The assumption that compliers have the same mean of Y (0) as never takers and the same mean of Y (1) as always takers is testable: if it is satisfied thenβ E F E must be equal to the coefficient of D ik in an OLS regression of Y ik on D ik and pool fixed effects. Many of the studies in our literature review find that those two coefficients are significantly different.
Third, simulations shown in Subsection 4.1 suggest that β E F E − ∆ LAT E increases when the number of takers decreases. Intuitively, when T decreases the support of L increases, and therefore β E F E gives more heterogeneous weights to pools depending on their value of L/N .
4 To do so, one would first need to derive a simple formula for EA
, to assess by how much this quantity overestimates EA (D(1)). As one can see from the proof of Lemma 3.1, the algebra used to derive a simple formula for EA i:
To conclude this subsection, it is worth noting that in our simulations we find that the variance ofβ E F E is always slightly lower than that ofÊ
. Therefore, there is a biasvariance trade-off between these two estimators. Unfortunately, we have not been able to study this trade-off formally. A route to do so would require to write the asymptotic variance ofÊ A (∆ Y )/Ê A (∆ D ) as a function of moments of P. This appears to be difficult. This for instance requires to write V ∆ D as a function of moments of P. However, the algebra used in the proof of Lemma 3.1 to write, say, E A i:Z i =1 w 1 i φ(P i ) as a function of moments of P no longer works for E A i:
we compare the root-mean-squared error (RMSE) of both estimators in a variety of realistic designs. We find thatÊ
has a lower (resp. higher) RMSE thanβ E F E in designs where pools bear a small (resp. high) proportion of takers, and in designs where pools bear a small (resp. large) number of applicants.
Comparison with the initial offer estimator
Let Z ik = 1{R ik ≤ S k } be a dummy variable equal to 1 for the S k applicants of each pool initially receiving an offer. Letγ I P S (resp.α I P S ) denote the coefficient of Z ik in an OLS regression of Y ik (resp. D ik ) on Z ik where applicants are reweighted by the following propensity score weights:
Let alsoβ I P S denote the coefficient of D ik in a 2SLS regression of Y ik on D ik , using Z ik as the instrument, and where applicants are reweighted by w I ik . As shown in Section 2,β I P S has often been used to estimate ∆ LAT E . β I P S is a consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of
is not a function of the ordering of takers and non-takers in the waiting list. Therefore, under Assumption 1 it is easy to show that Z ik satisfies the random instrument assumption in Imbens & Angrist (1994) . Then, one can show that under Assumptions 1-6 and appropriate technical conditions,
,
The question then arises as to which estimator is the most efficient. Unfortunately, we have not been able to answer this question formally, here again because we have not been able to derive a simple formula for the asymptotic variance ofÊ A (∆ Y )/Ê A (∆ D ). Still, in all our simulations we find that the variance ofÊ A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D is substantially smaller than that ofβ I P S . A likely explanation for this finding goes as follows. In expectation, the treatment rate difference between applicants that receive / do not receive an offer is larger than between applicants in / out the first round of offers. Specifically, under the assumption that applicants that do not receive an offer cannot get treated, 5 one can show that
As E A δ D and E A ∆ D respectively appear in the denominator of the influence functions of
3) probably explains why in our simulations we always find thatÊ A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D has a lower variance thanβ I P S . Equation (3) also suggests that those efficiency gains are increasing in S/N , the ratio of seats to applicants, and decreasing in T /N , the ratio of takers to applicants.
Still, initial offer estimators can be useful to understand where the difference betweenβ E F E and E A (∆ Y )/Ê A (∆ D ) stems from. As mentioned above,β E F E consistently estimates the effect of the treatment when compliers have the same mean of Y (0) as never takers and the same mean of Y (1) as always takers. Even then, it follows from Equation (2) thatβ E F E does not converge towards ∆ LAT E but towards a weighted average of compliers' LATEs in each pool. If the effect of the treatment is homogeneous across pools, this weighted average is equal to ∆ LAT E . Otherwise, it differs from it. Therefore,
does not estimate the effect of the treatment, or because treatment effects are heterogeneous across pools. To assess if the latter is likely to explain the difference between those two estimators, one can compareβ I P S toβ I F E , the coefficient of D ik in a 2SLS regression of Y ik on D ik and pool fixed effects using Z ik as the instrument.β I P S estimates ∆ LAT E , whileβ I F E estimates a weighted average of compliers' LATEs in each pool. Any difference between these two coefficients must come from heterogeneous treatment effects across pools. Ifβ I P S andβ I F E are close, this is suggestive evidence that the difference betweenβ
is unlikely to arise from heterogeneous treatment effects.
Extensions
Testing
In this subsection, we show that S < T , one of the requirements of Assumption 2, is testable. For any α ∈ (0, 1), let l(α) = max l ∈ {S, ..., N } :
5 When this assumption is not satisfied, the main conclusion of Equation (3) remains true: one can still
Theorem 3.3 If Assumption 1 holds, then for any P such that
The test in Theorem 3.3 is useful to assess the plausibility of Assumption 2. When it is conducted simultaneously in several pools, one needs to account for multiple testing and adjust p-values accordingly. We recommend against discarding pools where this test is not rejected. In simulations where Assumption 2 holds in some but not in all pools, we find that using only pools where this test is rejected to estimate, say,Ê A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D leads to a more biased estimator than using all pools. Pools where the test is not rejected includes both pools where Assumption 2 fails to hold and pools where Assumption 2 holds but takers are at low ranks in the waiting list. Discarding this latter group of pools creates a bias which seems to dominate that arising from keeping the former group. These simulations are not shown here due to a concern for brevity, but they are available upon request.
Non-equivalence between initial-and subsequent-rounds offers
Until now, we have assumed that offers made in the initial round are equivalent to offers made in subsequent rounds. However, some articles in our review find different acceptation rates for first-round and subsequent-rounds offers. This suggests that these two types of offers are sometimes not equivalent. Our framework can be extended to allow for this possibility. Let 
, the average effects of receiving a first-round and a subsequent-rounds offer on applicants' outcome (resp. treatment). Similarly, E A ∆ Y /E A ∆ D now identifies a weighted average of the LATEs of applicants that comply with a first-round and with a subsequent-rounds offer. On the other hand, if offers made in the first and in subsequent rounds are not equivalent,β I P S consistently estimates ∆ LAT E only if the following, stronger monotonicity condition is satisfied:
There should be no applicant that gets treated if she receives a subsequent-rounds offer but that remains untreated if she receives an initial-round offer.
Fuzzy capacity constraints
So far, we have assumed that offers are made until exactly S seats are filled. However, program implementers might sometimes prefer to impose "fuzzy" constraints on the number of seats available. Indeed, fuzzy constraints enable them to make less rounds of offers, an important advantage when they have little time to fill their seats. Specifically, let S and S + M respectively denote the minimum and the maximum number of seats for treatment available in the representative pool of applicants we considered in Subsection 3.1. If M = 0, the capacity constraint is sharp. Then, the fastest way of filling the seats is to start by making offers to the S first applicants in the waiting list. If none refuse, the offer process stops. If r > 0 refuse, the next r applicants receive a second round of offers, and so on and so forth until the S seats are filled. If M > 0, the capacity constraint is fuzzy. Then, the fastest way of filling the seats is to start by making offers to the S + M first applicants in the waiting list. If r ≤ M refuse, the offer process stops. If r > M refuse, the next r applicants receive a second round of offers, and so on and so forth until at least S seats have been filled. It is easy to see that this second process terminates after fewer rounds than the first. Notice that with sharp capacity constraints, in each pool the last applicant receiving an offer must be a taker. With fuzzy capacity constraints, this no longer needs to be the case.
We have not been able to prove that Lemma 3.1 still holds with fuzzy capacity constraints. To assess the properties of our estimators in that case, we repeat all the simulations shown in Subsection 4.1 with fuzzy constraints. Our main findings still hold. First,
are still biased estimators of ∆ IT T , ∆ F S , and ∆ LAT E . Third,β I P S is still an unbiased estimator of ∆ LAT E , but it still has a larger variance thanÊ A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D . These simulations are not shown here due to a concern for brevity, but they are available upon request.
Covariates
Articles estimating the effects of treatments allocated by randomized waiting lists usually include control variables in their estimation. Doing so is desirable to increase statistical precision. In this subsection, we show that in our setting, one can also control for covariates.
Let us first introduce some notation. Let X = ((X i ) 1≤i≤N ) denote a vector stacking the covariates of applicants in the representative pool of applicants introduced in Subsection 3.2. For every k ∈ {1, ..., K}, let X k = ((X ik ) 1≤i≤N k ) denote a vector stacking the covariates of applicants in the kth of the K pools we observe. Let also
w DR ik is the product of three terms. w R ik downweights treated applicants receiving an offer, the term between brackets is a propensity score weight, and N k /(N k − 1) upweights applicants to compensate for the fact w DR ik essentially drops one applicant per pool. One can show that Frisch & Waugh, 1933) , one can show that
Thus, when X ik only includes a constantÊ
We now introduce generalizations of Assumptions 1 and 6 to the case with covariates:
Assumption 1X (Conditional on P and X , R follows a uniform distribution on
Assumption 6X (Independent and identically distributed pools of applicants)
, and have the same probability distribution as (P, X , R).
Relative to Assumption 1, Assumption 1X further requires that applicants' random numbers be attributed independently of their covariates. Relative to Assumption 6, Assumption 6X further requires that in each pool, applicants' covariates be independent of all the random variables attached to applicants in other pools.
One can show that under Assumptions 1X, 2-3, 6X, and appropriate technical conditions, E A ∆ ε(Y |X) is a consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of ∆ IT T when the number of pools goes to +∞. Consistency follows from the two following facts. First, Equation (4) shows thatÊ A (∆ Y ) is equal to the coefficient of Z ik in an OLS regression of Y ik on Z ik where applicants are reweighted by w DR ik . Second, this coefficient has the same probability limit asÊ A ∆ ε(Y |X) : under Assumption 1X, Z ik is independent from X ik in the reweighted sample, so adding X ik to the regression does not change the limit of the coefficient of Z ik . Asymptotic normality follows from standard results on OLS regression coefficients. Similarly, one can show that under Assumptions 1X, 2-5, 6X, and technical conditions,Ê A ∆ ε(D|X) andÊ A ∆ ε(Y |X) /Ê A ∆ ε(D|X) are consistent and asymptotically normal estimators of ∆ F S and ∆ LAT E .
We do not derive the variances ofÊ
To estimate those variances, we recommend using the cluster-robust estimator of the variance of the regression coefficient corresponding to each estimator, clustering at the pool level. In simulations shown in Subsection 4.2, we find that these estimators approximate well the variances of our estimators when the number of pools is large enough.
In applications where the number of pools of applicants is too small to rely on asymptotic approximations, one can follow the steps listed below to test with level α the null hypothesis that Y (0, D(0)) ∼ Y (1, D(1)) while controlling for covariates. Those steps are the following:
In each pool, draw random numbers (R
, the coefficient of Z * ik in an OLS regression of Y ik on Z * ik and X ik among the sample of applicants with R * ik = L k , and where applicants are reweighted by
CompareÊ A ∆ ε(Y |X)
to the α/2th and 1 − α/2th quantiles ofÊ * A ∆ ε(Y |X) over those B replications. Reject the null ifÊ A ∆ ε(Y |X) is lower than the α/2th quantile, or if it is greater than the 1 − α/2th quantile.
Other extensions
So far, we have assumed that the treatment is binary. When the treatment takes a finite number of values {0, 1, ..., d}, one can still use the estimators we propose, provided one replaces
estimates the average causal response parameter defined in Angrist & Imbens (1995) .
Finally, our approach could also be used to estimate quantile treatment effects instead of mean effects. For instance, Lemma 3.1 implies that for any z ∈ {0, 1} and for any y in the support of the outcome, E A i:
. Therefore, the effect of offering the treatment on quantiles of the applicants' outcome distribution is identified.
Monte-Carlo simulations
Simulations comparing estimators
In this subsection, we conduct a Monte Carlo study to illustrate the properties of our estimators and to compare them to the ever offer and initial offer estimators. In Section 2, we found that in our sample of studies, the median number of pools of applicants is 58, the median number of applicants per pool is 68, the average ratio of seats to applicants is 0.44, and the median share of never takers is 0.30. Therefore, we consider a first design with 60 pools of applicants, where each pool has 25 seats for treatment and 60 applicants, and where 20 applicants are never takers, 35 are compliers, and 5 are always takers. Below, we consider other designs where we vary those parameters. Doing so, we always set them at realistic values found in a non-negligible fraction of the studies in our sample.
The previous section shows that the differences between the mean of Y (0) (resp. Y (1)) of compliers and never takers (resp. always takers) both determine the bias of the ever offer estimators. Therefore, we further reviewed the literature to find estimates of those differences, which can be estimated using techniques described in Imbens & Rubin (1997) . Unfortunately, none of the papers in our review estimate them. Two papers can still give us some guidance. Both study the effects of oversubscribed US charter schools on students' test scores, and both estimate the mean score difference between compliers and never takers the year before they are offered to join a charter school. Under the assumption that this difference is stable over time, this baseline difference is a good proxy of the difference in the mean of Y (0) between those two groups. (2016) and Mealli et al. (2004) examples show. We assume that compliers and always takers have the same mean of Y (1) because we could not find any estimate of the difference between these two means. Finally, most articles in our review find treatment effects included between 0 and 0.4 standard deviation, so 0.2 is a realistic effect size. Assuming that all applicants have the same treatment effect ensures that the differences between the estimators we consider cannot arise from heterogeneous effects.
Once applicants' potential treatments and outcomes have been drawn, random numbers following the same probability distribution as in Assumption 1 are attributed to them. Then, treatment offers are made in each pool according to that random ordering until all seats are filled, and observed treatments and outcomes are determined accordingly. Finally, we estimate
We repeat this procedure 500 times, and we report the mean, confidence interval, median, and standard error (SE) of each estimator. We also report the RMSE of each estimator, exceptα I P S and γ I P S because these two estimators are not meant to estimate any of our parameters of interest. In this first design, ∆ F S , ∆ IT T , and ∆ LAT E are respectively equal to 0.583, 0.117, and 0.2. Table 2 below. In Panel A, the mean ofα E F E is significantly different from ∆ F S , while the mean ofÊ A ∆ D is not. Similarly, in Panel B (resp. C), the mean ofγ E F E (resp.β E F E ) is significantly different from ∆ IT T (resp. ∆ LAT E ), while the mean of
Results are shown in
is not. However, as the bias ofβ E F E is small and its variance is slightly lower than that ofÊ A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D , the RMSE ofβ E F E is also slightly lower than that ofÊ A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D .β I P S does not differ from ∆ LAT E , but its variance is twice as large as the variances ofβ E F E andÊ A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D , and its RMSE is 50% larger. 202 [0.197,0.208] 0.203 0.061 0.061
Notes. The table simulates the initial offer estimators, the ever offer estimators, and the estimators proposed in this paper. Panels A, B and C report estimates of the first-stage, intention-to-treat, and LATE parameters, respectively. Columns 2 to 6 display the mean, 95% confidence interval, median, standard error and root mean square error of estimators indicated in the first column. These statistics are computed from 500 replications of the lottery draw ordering applicants in each pool. In each simulation, the number of pools K is equal to 60, the number of candidates per pool N k is equal to 60, the number of seats S k is equal to 25, the number of takers T k is equal to 40, and 35 takers are compliers while 5 are always takers. The potential outcome in the absence of treatment (Y (0)) is drawn from a N (0, 1) distribution for compliers and always takers, and from a N (0.4, 1) distribution for never takers. The treatment effect is homogenous:
With this data generating process, the true values of the first-stage, intention-to-treat, and LATE parameters are ∆ F S = 0.583, ∆ IT T = 0.117, and ∆ LAT E = 0.2, respectively.
In the next designs, we only reportβ I P S ,β E F E , andÊ A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D due to a concern for brevity. We consider a second design with 120 pools and where all the other parameters are the same as in the first design. Results are shown in the first panel of Table 3 below. The mean ofβ E F E is very close to that in Table 2 . This illustrates the fact that this estimator does not converge towards ∆ LAT E when the number of pools grows.
Then, we consider a third design with 30 never takers, 25 compliers, and 5 always takers per pool, and where all the other parameters are the same as in the the second design. Results are shown in the second panel of Table 3 . Increasing the number of never takers substantially increases the bias ofβ E F E , whose mean is now 21.0% smaller than ∆ LAT E . Accordingly, the RMSE ofβ E F E is 7.5% larger than that ofÊ A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D . L k now takes values in {25, ..., 55} instead of {25, ..., 45} in the first two designs. This aggravates the bias arising from the factβ E F E gives greater weight to pools where L k /N k is closer to 1/2, because some pools now have values of L k /N k further away from 1/2. Increasing the number of never takers also increases the variance ofβ I P S , as explained in Subsection 3.4.
Then, we consider a fourth design with 30 applicants per pool, 15 of which are never takers, 12 are compliers, and 3 are always takers, and where all the other parameters are the same as in the third design. Results are shown in the third panel of Table 3 . Decreasing the number of applicants per pool increases the bias ofβ E F E , whose mean is now 35.0% smaller than ∆ LAT E . β E F E does not downweight applicants that receive an offer and get treated. This downweighting is equivalent to dropping one applicant: the smaller the number of applicants, the more this downweighting matters. Table 3 below. Decreasing the difference between the mean of Y (0) among never takers and compliers decreases the bias ofβ E F E . In this design, takers are as over-represented among applicants with Z ik = 1 as in the fifth design, but they differ less from non-takers than in the fifth design, hence the smaller bias ofβ E F E . The mean ofβ E F E is still 18% smaller than ∆ LAT E , but the RMSE ofβ E F E is now 6.4% smaller than that ofÊ A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D . In this design, variance dominates bias.
Overall,β E F E is heavily biased in some designs, but only mildly biased in other designs.β E F E is heavily biased when the share of never takers is large, when there are few applicants per pool, and when the mean potential outcomes of compliers differ more from that of never and always takers.Ê A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D has a lower RMSE thanβ E F E in those designs, but the converse is true in other designs. On the other hand,Ê A ∆ D has a lower RMSE thanγ E F E in all designs.Ê A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D has a much lower RMSE thanβ I P S in all designs. 
Notes. The table displays variants of the simulations in Table 2 , Panel C (LATE parameter). Columns 2 to 6 display the mean, 95% confidence interval, median, standard error and root mean square error of estimators indicated in the first column. Simulations are conducted with the same procedure as in Table 2 , with 500 replications. Design 2 (first panel) is based on design 1 in Table 2 , with 120 pools instead of 60. Design 3 (second panel) is based on design 2 with 30 takers instead of 40 (25 compliers instead of 35). Design 4 (third panel) is based on design 3 with 30 applicants per pool, 15 of which are never takers, 12 are compliers, and 3 are always takers. Design 5 reproduces design 4, drawing the potential outcome of never takers in the absence of treatment from a N (0.2, 1) distribution instead of a N (0.4, 1) distribution.
Simulations assessing the proposed inference methods
In this subsection, we conduct a Monte-Carlo study to assess the performance of the inference methods we propose, both for our estimators without and with covariates.
First, we assess the performance of the methods we propose that rely on asymptotic approximations. Here, a goal is to get a sense of the number of pools required for those approximations to be valid. In the context of cluster-robust inference, Carter et al. (2013) show that heterogeneity between clusters reduces the speed at which the cluster-robust t-statistic converges towards its asymptotic distribution. This suggests that our estimators might also converge more slowly when pools are heterogeneous. Therefore, we consider a design where pools have heterogeneous numbers of applicants, seats, and takers, and where applicants have heterogeneous potential outcomes distributions across pools. We also consider binary potential outcomes to avoid the possibility that ∆ Y is normally distributed.
Our design is the following. For any real number x let x denote the integer closest to x. We let N k follow a uniform distribution on {30, ..., 90}, we let T k follow a uniform distribution on { 0.4(N k − 1) , ..., 0.9(N k − 1) }, and we let S k follow a uniform distribution on
is heterogeneous across strata, satisfies Assumption 2, and has a first moment in line with what we found in our literature review. To simplify, we assume that D ik (0) = 0 meaning that there are no always takers. We let X ik be a dummy variable following a Bernoulli distribution with parameter 1/2, and we let Y ik (0) = 1{0.4D ik (1) + 0.01(S k − 60) + 0.2X ik + ε ik ≥ 0}, where ε ik follows a N (0, 1) distribution. This leads to P (Y ik (0) = 1) ≈ 0.652. Finally, we let Y ik (1) = Y ik (0).
We first let K = 60, as in our first design in the previous subsection. We then let K = 20, K = 15, and K = 10. For each value of K, we draw 2000 samples, and for each sample
where Z ik is the instrument for D ik , applicants are reweighted by w DR ik , and standard errors are clustered at the pool level. For each estimator, we also estimate the percentage of times that ∆ LAT E = 0 is rejected in a 10% level t-test. Finally, and following the recommendation in McCaffrey & Bell (2003) and Cameron & Miller (2015) , we estimate the percentage of times that ∆ LAT E = 0 is rejected in a degree-of-freedom (DOF) adjusted 10% level t-test, where the t-statistic is compared to the critical value from a t-distribution with K −1 degrees of freedom. The 95% confidence intervals of the sizes of our tests are reported between parentheses.
Results are shown in Table 4 below. With 60 pools, the mean of our estimator of the variance ofÊ A ∆ Y /Ê A ∆ D is very close to its true variance. Accordingly, the size of our 10% level test does not significantly differ from 0.1, even without the DOF adjustment. The mean of our estimator of the variance ofÊ A ∆ ε(Y |X) /Ê A ∆ ε(D|X) is also very close to its true variance, and the size of our 10% level test also does not significantly differ from 0.1. With 20 and 15 pools of applicants, our 10% level tests have slightly greater size than expected, but our DOF adjusted tests have correct size. Finally, with 10 pools of applicants the 10% level DOF adjusted test has correct size forÊ
Overall, the inference methods we propose that rely on asymptotic approximations seem to perform well even with as few as 15 pools of applicants. Notes. Each panel simulates the estimators of the variance of ∆ LAT E proposed in this paper and that rely on asymptotic approximations. Panels A, B, C and D display results for samples of 60, 20, 15 and 10 pools, respectively. In each panel, the first line considers the estimator without covariate introduced in subsection 3.3, and the second line considers the estimator with covariates introduced in subsection 3.5. The treatment effect Y ik (1) − Y ik (0) is equal to 0 for every observation. The number of applicants, seats, and takers vary across pools; they are drawn from uniform distributions (see text for details). Each line displays summary statistics over 2000 replications. Column 1 reports the variance of ∆ LAT E across all replications. Column 2 displays the average of the estimated variance across replications. Column 3 displays the proportion of replications in which the absence of effect (∆ LAT E = 0) is rejected in a standard 10% level t-test (a 95% confidence interval for that rejection rate is reported in parentheses). Column 4 displays the proportion of replications in which the absence of effect (∆ LAT E = 0) is rejected in a degree-of-freedom (DOF) adjusted 10% level t-test, where the t-statistic is compared to the critical value from a t-distribution with K − 1 degrees of freedom (a 95% confidence interval for that rejection rate is reported in parentheses).
Second, we assess the performance of the randomization inference methods we propose for applications with few pools. We consider the same design as above, but we set K = 5. In each replication, we redraw 200 random vectors (R * 1k , ..., R * N k k ) in each pool of applicants, we estimateÊ * A ∆ Y (resp.Ê * A ∆ ε(Y |X) ) as explained in Subsection 3.3 (resp. 3.5), and we reject the null ifÊ A ∆ Y (resp.Ê A ∆ ε(Y |X) ) is either lower than the 5th percentile of the distribution ofÊ * A ∆ Y (resp.Ê * A ∆ ε(Y |X) ), or greater than its 95th percentile. Results are shown in Table 5 below. Our tests without and with covariates both have correct size. 
0.107 ([0.093,0.120 
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Notes. The table reports simulations of the randomization tests proposed in subsections 3.3 and 3.5. The data generating process is the same as in Table 4 , with 5 pools. The first line reports the proportion of replications in which the null (1)) is rejected in a 10% level test when no covariates are included. The second line reports the same rejection rate when one covariate is included. 95% confidence intervals of these rejection rates are reported in parentheses.
Application
In this section, we use our results to revisit Behaghel et al. (2017) . This article studies the effect of a boarding school for disadvantaged students. This school has capacity constraints at the gender × grade level, dictated by the number of beds in the single-sex and grade-specific dormitories where students sleep. 14 gender × grade pools have more applicants than seats. In each pool, applicants are assigned random numbers following the probability distribution in Assumption 1. Seats are offered following that random ordering. Offers stop when all seats are filled. Table 6 below shows the number of applicants, the number of seats, the rank of the last applicant that received an offer, and the p-value of the test of S k = T k proposed in Theorem 3.3, for each of those 14 pools. Table 6 also shows the rejection thresholds of an Holm-Bonferroni procedure with 14 tests and a 0.05 family-wise error rate. The average number of applicants per pool is 28.2. The average number of seats per pool is 15.3. The average rank of the last applicant receiving an offer is 18.4, thus implying that the proportion of applicants that decline their offer is 17.1%. In this article, the number of pools, their average size, and the share of applicants that decline an offer are all below the corresponding averages in our sample of articles analyzing randomized waiting lists (see Section 2). In 13 pools out of 14, the null hypothesis that S k = T k is rejected by the Holm-Bonferonni procedure. The pool where this null is not rejected only accounts for 1.8% of the total sample. Overall, one can be reasonably confident that S k < T k in most pools. Notes. Each line describes one of the 14 pools analyzed in Behaghel et al. (2017) . Columns 2 and 3 display the number of candidates and seats in each pool. Column 4 reports the lottery number of the last applicant receiving an offer. Column 5 displays the p-value of the test of S k = T k proposed in Theorem 3.3. Pools are ordered from the smallest to the largest p-values, and Holm-Bonferroni rejection thresholds with 14 tests and a 0.05 family-wise error rate are given in Column 6.
The main result in Behaghel et al. (2017) is that attending the boarding school increases the test scores of applicants that comply with their offer by around 20% of a standard deviation per year spent in the school. This effect is measured two years after the lottery took place. Behaghel et al. (2017) follow results from an earlier version of this paper (see de Chaisemartin & Behaghel, 2015) and use estimators very close to those we propose here. In Table 7 below, we present the estimators we propose in the current version of this paper, as well as the initial and ever offer estimators. On the left side of the table, we report estimators without controls.
On the right side, we report estimators with the same controls as in Behaghel et al. (2017) . 6 Below each estimator, we report an estimator of its standard error between parentheses. To estimate those standard errors, we repeat 500 times a block-bootstrap procedure where 14 pools are drawn with replacement from our sample of 14 pools. This allows us to estimate the variance-covariance matrix of our estimators, and to test whether they differ, something we could not do using the variance estimators we propose in Subsection 3.3. Finally, below the standard error of our estimators of the ITT, we report the p-value of the randomization test presented in Subsection 3.3 attached to that estimator.
Panel A shows estimators of the effect of receiving an offer on the number of years applicants spend in the boarding school. As perα E F E , this effect is equal to 1.380. As perÊ A ∆ D , it is equal to 1.301 years. The t-stat of the difference between those two estimators is equal to 2.351. In applications with a small number of pools, simulations shown in Subsection 4.2 suggest that t-stats should be compared to critical values from a t-distribution with K − 1 DOF. Here, this yields a DOF adjusted p-value equal to 0.035.α I P S is substantially smaller thanÊ A ∆ D , because some applicants out of the first round of offers receive an offer in subsequent rounds and join the school. Estimators without and with covariates are similar. 
andβ E F E,X are both insignificant (DOF adjusted p-value respectively equal to 0.215 and 0.268). Similarly, the differences between D|X) andβ I P S,X are both insignificant (DOF adjusted p-values respectively equal to 0.233 and 0.596). Finally, we estimatê β I F E , the initial offer 2SLS estimator with pool fixed effects. Without covariates, it is equal to 0.099. With covariates, it is equal to 0.146. These estimators are close to initial offer estimators with propensity score reweighting. As discussed in Subsection 3.4, this suggests that the
F E,X do not come from heterogeneous treatment effects across pools.
Overall, researchers using the initial offer estimators would wrongly conclude that the boarding school does not significantly increases students' test scores. Similarly, researchers using the ever offer estimators would significantly overestimate the effect of offering a seat on the number of years spent in the boarding school. This could affect the results of an analysis comparing the costs and the benefits of offering a seat to applicants. Behaghel et al. (2017) find that the expenditure per student and per year is 10 900 euros larger in the boarding school than in the schools attended by applicants that do not receive an offer. A researcher usingα E F E to estimate the cost of offering a seat would overestimate this cost by (1.38 − 1.30)×10900 = 670.77 euros. Researchers using ever offer estimators would also underestimate the effect of the school on compliers' test scores by around 20%, though here this difference is not significant.
It would be interesting to use our estimators to revisit other applications, especially applications with a large share of non-takers. Indeed, it is in those applications that using our estimators instead of initial offer estimators produces the largest efficiency gains. It is also in those applications that the ever offer estimators are the most biased. Unfortunately, the articles in our review use proprietary data, thus precluding us from revisiting their findings. Notes. The table compares the initial offer estimators, the ever offer estimators, and our estimators, using data from Behaghel et al. (2017) . The first three columns do not include covariates, and the next three include the same covariates as in Behaghel et al. (2017) . Panels A, B, and C report estimates of the first-stage, intentionto-treat, and LATE parameters, respectively. Standard errors from a block-bootrap procedure are displayed between parentheses. P-values of the randomization tests presented in Subsections 3.3 and 3.5 are reported below the standard errors in Panel B.
Conclusion
Seats for oversubscribed treatments are often allocated as follows. Applicants are ordered randomly on a waiting list. Those with a random order lower than or equal to the number of seats receive the initial round of offers. If all of them comply with their offer to get treated, offers stop. If some of them do not comply, the next applicants in the waiting list receive offers. Offers stop when all the seats for treatment have been filled. In this paper, we start by proposing estimators of the effect of offering a seat for treatment, and of the effect of the treatment on applicants that comply with their offer. We show that our estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal. Then, we review articles using randomized waiting lists to estimate causal effects. We show that the most commonly used estimators, the so-called ever offer estimators, are not consistent but have a smaller variance than the estimators we propose. Therefore, we recommend that researchers estimate both our estimators and the ever offer estimators. When they differ significantly, it might be preferable to report our estimators, as they are consistent. We also show that another commonly used estimator of the effect of the treatment on compliers, the so-called initial offer estimator, is consistent but has a larger variance than the estimator we propose. Therefore, this estimator should not be used. An exception to this rule is when offers made after the initial round do not follow applicants' random ordering. This is the case in some of the articles in our review that use this estimator. In such instances, our estimators cannot be used. Our results still show that researchers can expect large benefits from monitoring closely the offer process: Ensuring that offers are made following applicants' random ordering will enable them to use our estimators or the ever offer estimators, which will result in large efficiency gains.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1
We start by proving that E A i:Z i =1 w 1 i φ(P i ) = E A (φ(P )). To do so, we start by conditioning on {T < N }, before conditioning on {T = N }. First,
The first equality follows from the definition of w 1 i and Z i , and from the fact applicants with
The second equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, from the linearity of the conditional expectation operator, and from the fact N , S, D i (1), φ(P i ), and T are all functions of P. The third follows from the law of iterated expectations, and from the fact L must be included between S and N − T + S. The fourth follows from the following reasoning. Having L = l is equivalent to having S − 1 takers with R i ≤ l − 1, one taker with R i = l, and T − S takers with R i ≥ l + 1.
! possible values of R satisfy these constraints. Under Assumption 1, conditional on P each of those values has a probability 1 N ! of being realized, hence the fourth equality. The fifth equality follows from the following reasoning. Conditional on L = l and P, S takers out of T satisfy R i ≤ l, and Assumption 1 ensures that each taker has the same probability of satisfying this condition. Similarly, conditional on L = l, P, and T < N , l −S non-takers out of N −T satisfy R i ≤ l, and Assumption 1 ensures that each non-taker has the same probability of satisfying this condition. Therefore,
The sixth equality follows after rearranging the fifth. The seventh follows after some algebra and a change in variable in the summations. The eighth follows from the following reasoning. Let U be a random variable denoting the rank of the S − 1th unit when allocating randomly T − 1 units to N − 1 ranks. Under Assumption 2, 1 ≤ S − 1 ≤ T − 1 ≤ N − 1, so U is well-defined. U must be included between S − 1 and N − T + S − 1, and for every l ∈ {S − 1, ..., N − T + S − 1},
. Therefore,
T −1 ) = 1. Then, let V be a random variable denoting the rank of the Sth unit when allocating randomly T units to N − 1 ranks. Under Assumption 2 and conditional on T < N , 1 ≤ S ≤ T ≤ N − 1, so V is well-defined. V must be included between S and N − 1 − T + S, and for every l ∈ {S − 1, ..., N − 1 − T + S},
This completes the proof of the eighth equality.
Second,
The first equality follows from the fact that conditional on {T = N }, L = S, so w 1 i = 1 S . The second equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, from the linearity of the conditional expectation operator, and from the fact N , S, φ(P i ), and T are all functions of P. The third equality follows from the fact that under Assumption 1, conditional on P and T = N , each applicant has a probability S N of having R i ≤ S.
Finally,
The first equality follows from Equations (6) and (7), and from the law of iterated expectations.
The second equality follows from the law of iterated expectations. The third follows from Assumption 3.
We then prove that E A i:Z i =0 w 0 i φ(P i ) = E A (φ(P )). Here as well, we start by conditioning on {T < N }, before conditioning on {T = N }. First, This derivation follows from arguments similar to those used in the derivation of Equation (6). Second,
This derivation follows from the same arguments as those used in the derivation of Equation (7).
This derivation follows from the same arguments as those used in the derivation of Equation (8 
The second equality follows from Lemma 3.1, with φ(P i ) = Y i (0, D i (0)). Indeed, Assumption 3 ensures that E A (|Y (0, D(0))|) < +∞.
Similarly,
The second equality follows from Lemma 3.1, with φ(P i ) = Y i (1, D i (1)). Indeed, Assumption 3 ensures that E A (|Y (1, D(1))|) < +∞.
Subtracting Equation (9) to Equation (10) 
The first equality follows from the first point of the theorem. The second follows from Assumption 4. 
The first equality follows from the first point of the theorem. The second follows from Assumptions 4 and 5.
Dividing Equation (12) by Equation (11) yields the result. QED.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
The proof of Theorem 3.2 makes use of the following lemma.
Lemma B.1 Let A and B be two real numbers, and letÂ K andB K be two sequences of random variables. If there exists two sequences of i.i.d. random variables (a k ) k∈N and (b k ) k∈N with mean 0 and a second moment such that
Lemma B.1 is well-known so we do not reprove it.
Proof of 1 Let
We have
Moreover, Assumptions 6 and 7 ensure that (a k ) k∈N and (b k ) k∈N are i.i.d. and have mean 0 and a second moment. Therefore, it follows from Lemma B.1 that
Then, it follows from the first statement of Theorem 3.1 that under Assumptions 1-3, A B = E A ∆ Y = ∆ IT T . Plugging this equality in the previous display, and using the definitions of A, B,Â K , andB K yields
Finally, it follows from the central limit theorem, the Slutsky lemma, and the definition of a k and b k that
To prove thatV IT T p −→V
, it suffices to note that
Then, the result follows from the continuous mapping theorem, after a few lines of algebra.
One can follow similar steps to prove that
Proof of 2 Let
In the proof of the first point of the theorem, we have shown that
Similarly, one can show that
It follows from the second statement of Theorem 3.1 that under Assumptions 1-5,
= ∆ LAT E . Plugging this equality in the previous display yields
Finally, it follows from the central limit theorem, the Slutsky lemma, the definition of a k and b k , and a few lines of algebra that
To prove thatV
it suffices to note that
Then, the result follows from the continuous mapping theorem, after a few lines of algebra. QED.
Proof of Theorem 3.3
For any P such that S = T ,
If T = S, there are N S possible orderings of takers and non-takers in the waiting list, and under Assumption 1 all of those orderings have the same probability of being realized. Moreover, if T = S then having L ≤ l(α) is equivalent to having S takers with R i ≤ l(α), and no taker with R i > l(α).
l(α) S
orderings of takers and non-takers satisfy this condition. This proves the equality in the previous display. The inequality follows from the definition of l(α).
QED.
